Asset values often fall sharply once assets are placed outside of the …rm. When this happens, investors have fewer incentives to enforce their right to liquidate or reorganize the …rm. Instead, they may allow an underperforming business to continue and may even re…nance it under its current management. The problem that this creates is that …rm insiders then have fewer incentives to implement value-enhancing policies. Continuation is less likely to occur, however, when assets can fetch high values outside of the …rm. This paper looks at moral hazard in …rm performance under external …nancing. The testing strategy I implement sidesteps the issue of endogeneity between …nancial contracting and economic outcomes by using "asset tangibility"(i.e., the resale value or ease of redeployment of the …rm's assets) as a state variable. I show novel evidence that the performance of externally-funded investment is driven by the post-…nancing value/redeployability of the …rm's assets outside of the …rm. More precisely, I show that the component of investment that is explained by external …nancing is associated with superior …rm product market performance, valuation, and accounting returns when, subsequently to …nancing, asset tangibility turns out to be high. In contrast, economic outcomes associated with external funding are markedly poorer when asset tangibility is ex post low. Crucially, these dynamics are not observed for internally-funded investment. Inferences that the …rm observes superior business performance under external …nancing when assets are more tangible hold for both new outside equity and debt …nancing.
Introduction
While a large literature looks at the di¢ culties …rms face when they seek new …nancing, few studies look at the di¢ culties involved in enforcing existing …nancing agreements. In the business world, companies often choose to strategically default on their …nancial obligations, while investors lack the incentive to enforce their right to liquidate or reorganize the assets of those …rms. Public corporations that default are only seldom taken over by creditors or forced into bankruptcy procedures that lead to their complete liquidation (see, e.g., Gilson et al. (1990) and Altman (1991) ). Instead, defaults commonly lead to private renegotiations between …rms and investors, or to some form of corporate restructuring without termination. More often then not, companies that fail to deliver investors'promised returns are allowed to continue -and are even re…nanced -under the same management team.
Theoretical research has long recognized the di¢ culty of enforcing contracts that allow for a large scope of options -such as continuation of underperforming projects -in ex post renegotiations.
Recent theories characterize …nancing arrangements that credibly commit investors to enforce …rm liquidation or reorganization. Some of these arrangements resemble debt contracts (Harris and Raviv (1990) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , and Hart and Moore (1994)), while others resemble outside equity (Fluck (1998 (Fluck ( , 1999 and Myers (2000)). Although they vary in their design, one element that makes most of these contracts enforceable has a common real-world counterpart: the "tangibility"of a …rm's assets. Assets that are more tangible are easier to verify and repossess, which increases the value that outside investors may recover in the event of liquidation or reorganization. In theory, asset tangibility should lend credibility to investors'threat to take the …rm to bankruptcy court and/or to dismiss its management team, a¤ecting incentives to perform.
There is very limited evidence on the link between asset tangibility and …nancial contracting.
Early empirical studies were limited in documenting a positive association between the ratio of …xed-to-total assets and …nancial leverage (e.g., Friend and Lang (1988) , Titman and Wessels (1988) , and Rajan and Zingales (1995) ). More recently, research on …nancial development shows that industries with "harder"assets obtain more creditor …nancing in countries with poor contractual enforceability (Braun (2003) , Claessens and Laeven (2003) , and Acharya et al. (2004) ). 1 These pieces of evidence are broadly consistent with the idea that asset tangibility matters for raising external …nancing. However, they reveal little about the role of asset tangibility in underlying a channel between the enforceability of …nancial contracts, incentives, and performance. For example, we do not know if tangibility enhances contract enforceability in ways that have consequences for …rm value or real-side business performance (e.g., sales growth or investment e¢ ciency). By and large, the question of whether char-1 Other literatures explore related ideas (these cannot be exhausted here). For example, in the banking literature a number of studies examine the role of collateral in lending decisions (e.g., Besanko and Thakor (1987) , Berger and Udell (1990) , and Rajan and Winton (1995) ). In a recent paper, Benmelech et al. (2005) use real estate data to show that expected liquidation values drive the amount, price, and maturity of real estate loans.
acteristics that are associated with contract enforceability a¤ect the economic outcomes of …rms under external …nancing remains an unexplored issue. This is unfortunate, in that if characteristics such as the tangibility of a …rm's assets indeed ameliorate moral hazard in external …nancing, researchers may be overlooking a dimension in which to better understand real-world corporate …nancing. This paper empirically examines the role of asset tangibility in in ‡uencing corporate performance and valuation under external …nancing. In identifying a link between asset tangibility and economic outcomes, I propose that …rm insiders should have heightened incentives to adopt performanceenhancing policies when a …rm's assets are su¢ ciently tangible (i.e., valuable or liquid) following the contracting of external funds. The reason is simple: outside investors are in a better position to impose measures that hurt …rm insiders (e.g., trigger liquidation) when it is easier to …nd high-value alternative users for the …rm's assets. In sharp contrast, post-…nancing incentives to perform should be lower when the …rm's assets become signi…cantly less valuable outside of the …rm. The tests in this paper build on this identi…cation insight to characterize a causal link between …rm …nancing and performance. They do so highlighting the economic role played by asset tangibility in …nancial contracting. To wit, I look at whether post-…nancing …rm performance is governed by creditor's ability to enforce contracts, where enforcement ability (given by asset tangibility) is a contingent state variable that is outside the …rm's control. Di¤erently from most prior studies, the empirical measures of asset tangibility that I use gauge the liquidation value or the ease of redeployment of a …rm's assets by its creditors (hereinafter, the term tangibility is meant to summarize these characteristics). 2 In a nutshell, the evidence of this paper indicates that measures of …rm performance in product markets (relative-to-rival sales growth), value/growth opportunities (proxied by Q), and accounting returns (ROA) all increase with the component of capital expenditures that is explained by external …nancing activities when the …rm's assets are ex post more tangible. For example, I …nd that while externally-…nanced investment leads a …rm to outperform its product market rivals when the …rm's asset tangibility turns out to be high subsequent to raising external funds, the …rm underperforms those rivals when tangibility is low following …nancing. Crucially, these e¤ects are not observed when one considers the performance of a …rm's total investment ratios: it is only the component of investment that is associated with external …nancing that transmits the hypothesized creditor valuation e¤ect of asset tangibility onto …rm performance. In other words, when investment is …nanced with internal funds, economic outcomes are independent of underlying asset (recovery) values that would support enforceability. This last result highlights the nature of the moral hazard problem of …rm performance under external …nance. It also helps minimize concerns with the potential endogeneity of asset tangibility, …nancing, and performance (more on this shortly). 3 2 My approach emphasizes the notion that …nanciers are interested in the value they can obtain with the reallocation of assets under their control (e.g., the resale value of liquidated assets in markets for second-hand capital), rather than in how hard those assets are. See also Almeida and Campello (2004) , Campello (2005) , and Benmelech et al. (2005) . 3 While researchers typically consider tangibility as an exogenous asset characteristic (see Harris and Raviv (1991) ), I motivate the argument that tangibility can in ‡uence …rm performance under external …nancing with a simple moral hazard model. The model emphasizes the dynamic inconsistency problem engendered by ongoing …nancing relationships between …rms and investors: when a round of …nancing fails to generate the desired return it becomes a sunk cost, this in turn provides investors with an incentive to re…nance the …rm in case there are gains associated with project continuation. The problem that this creates is that if the …rm is expected to be re…nanced, then managers will have lower incentives to work in order to improve performance. Re…nancing is more likely to occur when the …rm's liquidation/reorganization yields very little to investors. On the other hand, re…nancing might not take place if the …rm's asset reallocation generates enough value so as to make termination pro…table -or, at least, as advantageous as continuation -thus a credible course of action. In this case, managers will have heightened incentives to perform if one assumes that they value control over going concerns and/or experience reputational losses when their …rms are liquidated or reorganized. 4 Although stylized, the model analysis is useful in that it frames the basic relations between …rm performance, asset tangibility, and external …nancing that I seek to characterize in the data.
Since a …rm's termination is typically triggered by holders of debt securities (bondholders and banks), one might conjecture that asset values should in ‡uence …rm performance only when outsiders provide funds via debt …nancing. However, the theoretical literature suggests that this is not necessarily the case (see, e.g., Williamson (1988) ). When assets are expected to maintain their value through shareholder-led restructurings, such as divestitures, spin-o¤s, and takeovers, equity investors, too, might exert more in ‡uence over managerial performance (cf. Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000) ). This implies that a …rm's leverage ratio is not the ideal …nancing measure to consider to link contracting and performance. 5 In this vein, the …nancing measure I use does not gauge the likelihood of bankruptcy, but it provides, on a …rm-by-…rm basis, a historical measure of the interest held by outside investors (debt and equity) over a …rm's …xed assets. This, in turn, allows me to determine whether debtholders and shareholders, independently, hold a more credible threat to actions that elicit better investment performance when the …rm has more valuable assets. I …nd that both types of …nancing instruments can in ‡uence …rm performance outcomes conditional on a …rm's asset tangibility.
The results I report are robust. For instance, my inferences do not hinge on a particular measure of asset tangibility. Measuring the tangibility of a …rm's assets is not an obvious task, and to ensure that my …ndings are robust I check for the main predictions of my theory using …ve di¤erent measures of throughout the analysis I consider the potential for endogeneity in tests involving asset tangibility. 4 The issue of reputational losses incurred by managers of bankrupt …rms is studied by Gilson (1993) . Gilson reports that none of the departing managers in his sample holds a senior management position at another exchange-listed …rm in the three-year period following dismissal, even though the mean departing manager's age is only 52 years.
5 A focus on leverage ratios presupposes a minor role for outside equity in providing incentives. It also presupposes that the likelihood of liquidation grows linearly with debt. Both of these assumptions are problematic. In particular, high indebtness/legal bankruptcy need not lead to asset liquidation. Further, with the exception of highly-distressed …rms, it is generally the case that high debt usage is associated with high debt capacity not …nancial status. E.g., larger …rms use more debt even though their pro…tability may be lower than that of smaller …rms.
tangibility. 6 The …rst (baseline) measure of asset tangibility that I use is a proxy for the expected liquidation value of …rms'main categories of operating assets: …xed capital, inventories, and accounts receivable (based on Berger et al. (1996) ). This proxy provides a measure of tangibility at the …rm level in every year of my sample. The second measure is a time-variant, industry-level proxy that captures the ease with which lenders may liquidate a …rm's assets. Speci…cally, Bureau of Census data on the demand for used capital are employed to gauge the level of activity in the market for second-hand assets among high-value users of a …rm's assets; i.e., among other …rms in the same industry (cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ). The third proxy gauges the ability of alternative high-value users of a …rm's assets to acquire those assets. In particular, it measures the degree of liquidity that industry rivals have on their balance sheets: a …rm's assets are likely to be more salable/redeployable when its industry rivals are not cash-constrained (also in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny). The fourth measure is based on historical recovery rates accruing to holders of defaulted corporate bonds, where bonds are assetcollateralized (taken from Altman and Kishore (1996) ). The …fth proxy I consider borrows from earlier papers in the capital structure literature: I use a …rm's "R&D intensity"to gauge the extent to which its assets are …rm-speci…c (Titman and Wessels (1988) ). Although these …ve proxies have very di¤er-ent sample properties 7 and characterize di¤erent dimensions of a …rm's asset tangibility, I …nd that my …ndings hold under each of these measures. Those …ndings continue to hold after I subject my estimations to a number of robustness checks involving changes to the model speci…cation, variable construction, sample selection criteria, and the use of alternative econometric techniques (OLS and GMM).
Throughout the analysis, I check whether my inferences are warranted by challenging the logic and reliability of my estimates. For example, I argue that the use of ex post asset tangibility as a theoretically-motivated, conditioning factor allows for a test of the idea that …nancial contracting drives economic outcomes. However, one matter of potential concern is whether performance reversecauses tangibility. A neoclassical argument could suggest that the optimizing …rm will invest in asset acquisition until the marginal cost of investment (the next dollar spent in …xed capital) equals the marginal bene…t from investment (a dollar from product sales). This could create a plausible link between performance and tangibility. On the other hand, note that it does not follow that …rms that perform well should expect to get more from the sale of their assets. One could argue, for example, that …rm-speci…c managerial input contributes to performance; and, once one separates a set of productive assets from its current controllers, those assets become signi…cantly less valuable (Hart and Moore (1994) ). Moreover, when high-value alternative users are unable to acquire a …rm's assets, those assets may end up being sold as scrap (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ). Notably, the very opposite case can be made as well: assets may become more valuable once they are taken away from a …rm (this would happen when managers overinvest). 6 Related measures are used in Almeida and Campello (2004) and Campello and Fluck (2004) . 7 E.g., some proxies are time-or industry-invariant, while others are only available for a subset of my sample period.
In spite of the di¢ culty of arguing for a clear-cut reverse-causality e¤ect between performance and tangibility, it is important to highlight that the direct e¤ect of tangibility on performance per se is of little interest to my story. What the current study proposes is that the performance of externally-…nanced investments will be lower (higher) if asset tangibility turns out to be low (high) after the …rm raises external funds. Hence, the case for simultaneity biases a¤ecting my inferences would necessitate a story in which an endogenous link between performance and tangibility will vary with the fraction of investment that is …nanced in the external markets.
In arguing for such a case, one could propose the following story: high performance reverse-causes high externally-…nanced investment, which in turn boosts tangibility. Crucially, this story cannot explain my …ndings. First, the empirical strategy I use places appropriate time lags between external …nancing, investment, tangibility, and performance outcomes (in this order). It is di¢ cult to argue the case that …nanciers'and insiders'actions and forecasts about asset prices and economic outcomes will exactly coincide over time so as to generate the results I …nd. Second, my basic tests revolve around relative-to-industry-rival …nancing, investment, tangibility, and performance metrics. Since rivals' …nancial policies, investment choices, asset liquidity, and competitive conduct are ultimately outside of the …rm's control set, the issue of reverse-causality becomes largely moot. For example, while one might argue that the anticipation of future high sales growth could make it easier for the …rm to raise funds for investment today, within my testing framework this story would need to perfectly account for the actions (…nancing and investing) and outcomes (tangibility and sales) involving the other …rms in the same industry-year. The story I propose, in contrast, arises naturally in an industry context: when a …rm has more external claims over its assets than its rivals, and when its assets become ex post more valuable that those of its rivals, the …rm will have incentives to outperform its rivals. 8 Third, the basic premises of the proposed reverse-causality story are not borne out in the data. For example, is not the case that externally-…nanced investment is positively associated with asset tangibility; in the data, that association is negative. Likewise, …rm performance (measured by cash ‡ows) is not positively related to my measure of external funding. Finally, if expectations about future performance reverse-cause current investment and tangibility, and results have nothing to do with moral hazard issues in external …nancing, then internally-…nanced investment, too, should generate the types of tangibility-performance interactions I report. However, I …nd that only the portion of investment that is associated with external funds has its performance outcomes in ‡uenced by asset tangibility.
Adding to the arguments above, in the balance of the analysis I explore in more depth a couple of alternative strategies in dealing with endogeneity. For example, a simultaneity argument could suggest that my focus on …xed capital may "hard-wire" some of my tests if …rms with better investment opportunities both …nd it easier to contract funds from outside investors today and, on the margin, become more tangible in the future (by investing in …xed, salable capital). 9 One way to check if my …ndings are generated by my test design in this way is to look at the results from an investment category that contributes to …rm performance but does not add to asset tangibility.
One such category is investment in R&D: a …rm's investment in product research and development may contribute to product market performance, growth opportunities, and pro…tability; but those …rm-speci…c expenditures tend to add very little (if any) to tangibility. When I re-run my tests using R&D investment, I …nd that performance under external …nancing still increases with the tangibility of the …rm's underlying assets. These …ndings make it more di¢ cult to argue that performance reverse-causes tangibility through an external …nancing channel.
I also look at the impact of exogenous macroeconomic shocks to asset tangibility upon my estimates. This is a worthwhile examination if one remains concerned with endogeneity biases in standard …rm panel regressions. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that a …rm will have a particularly di¢ cult time liquidating its productive assets when the circumstances leading it to economic distress also a¤ect the economic viability of its assets' best alternative users, that is, the other …rms in its industry. Based on the well-documented high cycle-sensitivity of durable goods sales, I look at the dynamics of the impact of tangibility on the performance of externally-…nanced investment over the course of the business cycle for durable goods producers. To do so, I use a two-step estimator relating …rm-level and exogenous macro-level information that borrows from Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello (2003) . Consistent with my earlier …ndings, these tests show that the association between performance and externally-…nanced investment is weaker under circumstances in which asset resale values/redeployability are sharply lower (durable goods industries in recessions).
Finally, one may wonder about the broader implications of the …ndings of this study. For example, are the dynamics described only relevant for …rms that are near bankruptcy? More important, what do they imply for overall corporate performance under external …nancing? The answer to the …rst question is that the empirical analysis accounts for both …rm pro…tability and indebtness. While it would seem plausible that investors might hold a bigger threat over the allocation of a …rm's assets only when the …rm underperforms and is highly-indebted, my evidence indicates that the tangibilityperformance channel is present in a broad cross-section of …rms. As for the second question, note that my results can also be interpreted in the following way: the greater a …rm's reliance on external funding, the more likely its performance will be tied to variations in the resale value/redeployability of its assets. This e¤ect applies to all …rms seeking funding from outside investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I lay out a simple model providing the intuition for my hypotheses about the relationship between externally-…nanced investment, …rm performance, and asset tangibility. Section 3 develops a testing strategy for the arguments discussed in Section 2. It reports empirical …ndings in support of the argument that asset tangibility positively a¤ects the performance of externally-…nanced investment. Section 4 concludes the paper.
A Simple Model of Dynamic Inconsistency in External Financing
I explore a simple moral hazard setup to characterize the e¤ect of asset tangibility on the performance of externally-…nanced investment. I note that the model discussed in turn will not characterize an optimal contracting game unless further structure is imposed. In particular, it takes an ongoing relationship between …rms and investors as given. Yet, it plainly illustrates the sorts of real-world timeinconsistency issues in contracting that assign a role to asset tangibility in in ‡uencing performance under external …nancing. Characterizing these dynamics in the data is the ultimate goal of this study.
Setup
The setup I use resembles that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , Berglöf and Roland (1998), and Kornai et al. (2003) . Assume two periods (three dates), one entrepreneur, and one …nancier. The entrepreneur is endowed with managerial talent but no wealth. Any project she selects needs to be funded by the …nancier; an agent endowed with wealth but no managerial ability. At date 0, the entrepreneur discovers an investment opportunity of ex ante unknown type. 10 It takes I units of capital to initiate a project and projects are of two types. High-quality projects yield a strictly positive veri…able monetary return of R h at the end of the …rst period (date 1). Projects of this type occur with publicly known probability (> 0) and require no managerial e¤ort to generate high returns in just one period. Low-quality projects, in contrast, require a high level of managerial e¤ort to succeed in the …rst period (i.e., to generate R h at date 1). When managers of low-quality projects exert low e¤ort, on the other hand, those projects fail to yield a monetary return at date 1. At that date, the …nancier can choose to take over the …rms'assets and dispose of them. This allows the …nancier to recapture a monetary reward whose date 2 realization, L, is determined by a random variable e L ( 0). Alternatively, the …nancier can re…nance the project (i.e., invest an additional I) and earn a monetary value of R l at the end of the second period (date 2); where 0 < R l < R h . Low-quality projects occur with probability 1 . The manager-entrepreneur privately learns about the quality of the project immediately after it is initiated. There is no discounting. 11 The timing and structure of the contracting game are depicted in Figure 1 .
As in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , I assume that …nancing is such that the …nancier makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the manager-entrepreneur, extracting all of the project's observable returns.
1 0 For simplicity, I assume that the entrepreneur cannot scrutinize projects, but I note that the model can be easily extended to incorporate pre-screening by the entrepreneur (as in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) ).
1 1 Notice that the same intuition obtained from this simple payo¤ and time structure could be obtained from a multi-period model with time discounting in which high managerial e¤ort implied more front-loaded monetary returns, while low e¤ort implied that those same returns would occur later in the investment horizon. Moreover, I assume that parties to a …nancial contract cannot commit not to renegotiate it. These assumptions entail no loss of generality for the model's central intuition and help us focus on insiders'incentives. While a natural interpretation of termination in this context might be one in which debtholders trigger bankruptcy when the …rm does not produce returns and subsequently resell the …rm's assets, termination might also mean that outside equity holders …re the manager and reorganize the …rm's asset base when the …rm underperforms (see Fluck (1998) ). Accordingly, the contracting game I model does not characterize …nancing instruments as either debt or equity contracts.
Although the entrepreneur does not extract monetary rents from the project under her control, she can extract private bene…ts. Bene…ts that accrue to managers of going concerns might include perquisites and reputation enhancement. Assume that projects which are not liquidated provide entrepreneurs with a private bene…t of N oL (> 0), whereas those bene…ts equal L (< 0) if the project is liquidated; that L is strictly negative captures a loss of managerial reputation and/or private bene…ts in liquidation. Also suppose that the likelihood of success may depend on managerial e¤ort, which is costly to her. E¤ort is assumed to be a binary choice: managers may exert either a high level of e¤ort ( h > 0) or low e¤ort ( l , normalized to 0).
Analysis
The decision to liquidate a project with ex ante unknown quality need not be a pure strategy. Assume the …nancier will choose to re…nance (alternatively, to liquidate) the project with probability (alternatively, 1
). The manager's anticipation of the likelihood that the …nancier will choose to liquidate her project should it fail to produce pro…ts at date 1 will in ‡uence her decision to exert e¤ort in the …rst period when she manages a low-quality project. In particular, the manager of a low-quality project will exert low e¤ort so long as
Eq. (2) establishes a minimum level of creditors'forbearance above which the manager-entrepreneur will always choose to exert low e¤ort. This expression suggests that the manager will be less likely to commit herself to a high level of e¤ort when: (a) e¤ort is too costly, (b) the private losses associated with liquidation are low, or (c) the private bene…ts from continuation are low.
Ex ante, the …nancier would want the entrepreneur to exert high e¤ort. Both parties understand,
however, that once a project fails to yield a monetary return in the …rst period, there will be an ex post incentive to re…nance the project. In particular, if
it will be ex post optimal for the …nancier to re…nance a low-quality project; i.e., set = 1. Because high e¤ort is costly and managers extract positive bene…ts from any project that is not liquidated, condition (2) will be automatically satis…ed. Of course, a re…nanced project is ine¢ cient if
When both (3) and (4) hold the …nancier essentially funds a poorly-managed, ine¢ cient project which he would never …nance ex ante. The discrepancy arises because (4) is an ex ante criterion whereas (3) is an ex post criterion (i.e., applies to the period where investment is already a sunk cost). While ex ante e¢ ciency is the relevant criterion for providing initial project …nancing, it is no longer the relevant criterion when deciding whether to re…nance or liquidate a project. That ex post decision is governed by the realization of the value of assets in liquidation.
The dynamic inconsistency between the ex ante and ex post criteria is at the heart of …nancing frictions between the parties of this model. The …nancier would like to credibly commit to a strategy in which he would liquidate all projects failing to yield a monetary return in the …rst period, so as to induce the manager-entrepreneur to adhere to a policy of high e¤ort when e¤ort is value-enhancing.
However, both parties know that once a low-quality project is revealed, the …nancier may still have an incentive to re…nance it. This, in turn, prompts the entrepreneur to exert less e¤ort.
If the entrepreneur expects projects to be re…nanced in the future, the …nancier's expected return (at date 0) is given by
which is positive so long as
When > and L < I the manager-entrepreneur exerts no e¤ort and all projects are funded (and re…nanced when necessary). This happens in spite of the ex ante ine¢ ciency.
Another possible solution is one in which all projects that fail to yield monetary returns in the …rst period are liquidated ex post. This obtains when
In other words, the …nancier can expect to elicit high managerial e¤ort when the liquidation value of the …rms'assets is high enough to ensure that liquidation is a credible ex post action. The problem with this requirement for a solution is that the liquidation value of a …rm's assets are outside of the control of the parties involved in the …nancing arrangement. The realization of e L will depend on the circumstances governing the market for the …rm's assets -these include, for example, the state of the economy and the demand for second-hand assets in an industry -and, of course, on the amount and mix of tangible assets the …rm has at liquidation -presumably, the underlying …rm production process should (exogenously) drive variations in the amount and mix of tangible, resalable assets.
Discussion
The "bare bones"model just described provides a rationale for the role of asset tangibility in eliciting high, value-enhancing insider input under external …nance. Asset tangibility can reduce the dynamic problem that arises when creditors decide to extend …nancing to projects in which e¤ort is an ex post choice variable. Consistent with this hypothesis, Gilson et al. (1990) present evidence suggesting that high tangibility leads creditors to choose asset liquidation over contract renegotiation when …rms are distressed. Also, in a theoretical setting, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) discuss the advantages of asset sales over debt rescheduling in reducing agency problems between …rm insiders and …nanciers.
Crucially, however, because the value of a …rm's assets in liquidation is uncertain, it cannot not be used to enforce equilibria where only projects that yield high monetary returns receive …nancing.
In what follows, I empirically examine the role of asset tangibility in enhancing externally-…nanced project performance in a straightforward manner. My analysis will isolate the component of …rm investment that is associated with external funding and subsequently test whether the …rm's investment performance is an increasing function of what external …nanciers can expect to recover from the …rm's assets outside the …rm's current organization. To my knowledge, an empirical investigation of whether asset tangibility -an innate asset characteristic associated with contract enforceabilityin ‡uences business performance and valuation under external …nancing is new to the literature.
Empirical Tests
The analysis of Section 2 suggests that asset tangibility ameliorates the types of (re-)…nancing decision problems creditors face by making liquidation threats more credible. Credible liquidation, in turn, gives incentives for insiders to implement actions that are value-/performance-enhancing. In order to implement a test of this argument, I need to specify an empirical model relating investment performance with external …nancing and asset tangibility. I will tackle this issue shortly, but …rst I describe the …rm-level data used in my tests (industry-and macro-level data are introduced later).
Sample
I consider the universe of manufacturing …rms over the 1971-2002 period with data available from COMPUSTAT's P/S/T and Research tapes on total assets, market capitalization, sales, debt, capital expenditures, cash holdings, inventories, earnings before extraordinary items, and plant property and equipment (capital stock). 12 All data are CPI-de ‡ated. I eliminate …rm-years for which the value of capital stock is less than $1 million (in 1971 dollars) and those displaying real asset or sales growth exceeding 100%. I also require that …rms only enter the sample if they appear for at least …ve consecutive years in COMPUSTAT. This last requirement conforms with the lagging structure used in the speci…cations I use and improves the quality of the …rm-by-…rm estimations described below.
Testing Strategy
My goal is to design an empirical model that tests whether external …nancing and asset tangibility jointly in ‡uence investment performance along the lines of the theory outlined above. This is not an obvious task since the literature does not provide obvious candidate measures for the main elements of my story. In what follows, I describe the implementation of empirical proxies for the central variables I want to examine: …rm performance, asset tangibility, externally-…nanced investment. I subsequently introduce a model speci…cation that captures the dynamics of the argument I propose.
Implementing Empirical Proxies
Performance. I consider three alternative ways of gauging corporate performance/value. The …rst approach I take is to measure a …rm's relative-to-rival performance in its product market. Following the approach used in the product market literature (e.g., Opler and Titman (1994) , and Campello (2003)) relative-to-industry-year sales performance is measured by subtracting from a …rm's sales growth at time t (equal to log(Sales) t log(Sales) t 1 ) the median of the other industry rivals'sales growth over the same period. Data on a …rm's total sales is taken from COMPUSTAT's item #12.
A relevant concern for those studying product market dynamics using data from COMPUSTAT regards the criteria used to assign …rms to particular industries at a more detailed level. As discussed in Clarke (1989) , Guenther and Rosman (1994) , and Kahle and Walkling (1997) , some of the industrial codes employed by COMPUSTAT are not useful in identifying economically meaningful markets. I follow the industry selection criteria used in Clarke (1989) , and retain only those …rm observations that are assigned to well-de…ned product markets using four-digit SIC codes. My sample contains as many as 106 product markets at the four-digit SIC level. However, as in previous papers in the product market literature, when adjusting …rm observations for industry-year e¤ects, I require the presence of a minimum of …ve rivals in the same industry-year (so that the measure of centrality is robust). The number of unique four-digit SICs falls to 86 when I use industry-year adjustments.
My second proxy is a forward-looking measure that incorporates information about the …rm's ability to realize value through capital deployments today and in the future: Q. Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (= (item #6 + (item #24 item #25) item #60 item #74) / (item #6)). The third proxy I use is a simple accounting measure: return over assets (ROA). This is computed as net income from operations (item #172) divided by assets.
Similarly to the relative-to-industry approach I use for sales growth, whenever feasible, I measure a …rm's Q and ROA relative to that of its industry-year median rival.
Asset Tangibility. I consider a number of alternative ways of gauging asset tangibility (Tangibility). The …rst approach I take is to construct a …rm-level measure of expected asset liquidation values that borrows from Berger et al. (1996) . In determining whether investors rationally value their …rms'abandonment option, Berger et al. gather data on proceeds from discontinued operations reported by a sample of COMPUSTAT …rms over the 1984-1993 period. The authors …nd that a dollar's book value produces, on average, 72 cents in liquidation value for total receivables, 55 cents for inventory, and 54 cents for …xed assets. Similarly to their paper, I estimate liquidation values for the …rm-years in my sample via the computation:
T angibility = 0:715 Receivables + 0:547 Inventory + 0:535 Capital;
where Receivables is COMPUSTAT's item #2, Inventory is item #3, and Capital is item #8. Following Berger et al., I add the value of cash holdings (item #1) to this measure and scale the result by total book assets. Arguably, the nature of the …rm's production process (technology, labor force, distribution channels, etc.) and the characteristics of its product demand (e.g., consumers' preferences regarding quality and payment terms) will largely determine the …rm's optimal asset allocation across …xed capital, inventories, accounts receivables, etc. To the extent that technological progress, cost and quality of labor (and other inputs), and consumer preferences are outside the …rm's control set, the computation of (8) should return a reasonable proxy for the expected liquidation value of a …rm's assets. However, there could be some degree of endogeneity in this measure of tangibility.
As will later become clear, this could be a problem for my tests under a scenario in which …rms strategically choose to hold more tangible assets than their industry rivals in anticipation of better relative future performance or when future performance reverse-causes relative tangibility. To tackle this issue, I need a measure of tangibility that is clearly exogenous to any particular …rm's balance sheet composition. The argument for endogenous biases of this sort in my tests becomes an unlikely proposition when I use the industry-level measures of asset tangibility described next.
The second measure of tangibility I use is a time-variant, industry-level proxy that gauges the degree of redeployability of …rms' assets. More precisely, the proxy captures the ease with which lenders can liquidate and sell o¤ a …rm's productive capital. Following Kessides (1990) and Worthington (1995) , I measure asset redeployability using the ratio of used to total (i.e., used plus new) …xed depreciable capital expenditures in an industry. The idea that the degree of activity in asset resale markets by industry counterparts -i.e., demand for second-hand capital -should in ‡uence …nancial contractibility along the lines I explore here was proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) (see also Williamson (1988) ). To construct this proxy, I hand-collect data on used and new capital acquisitions at the four-digit SIC level from the Bureau of Census'Annual Survey of the Manufacturers. Data on plant and equipment acquisitions are compiled by the Bureau every year, where the last survey identifying both used and new capital acquisitions by SIC code was published in 1996. I match my COMPUSTAT data set with the Census series, but note that estimations based on this measure of asset tangibility use smaller sample sizes since not all of COMPUSTAT's SIC codes are present in the Census data. Because this second measure of tangibility is industry-year-speci…c, regressions using this proxy do not allow for interactive industry-year …xed e¤ects (i.e., relative-to-rival inferences). Accordingly, I relax the data constraint of only considering observations from industry-years with a minimum of …ve observations when using this proxy for asset tangibility.
When checking the robustness of my central …ndings (Section 3.4.3), I experiment with three additional measures of asset tangibility. The …rst auxiliary proxy I consider is also an industry-level measure. In order to gauge industry rivals' ability to promptly acquire a …rm's assets, I compute the median ratio of cash and other liquid securities to total assets in each industry-year sampled.
The premise is that a …rm's assets are likely to be more salable -therefore making liquidation more credible -when its industry rivals are a ‡oat with cash. The second proxy is based on the recovery values of defaulted corporate bonds. Di¤erently from the previous proxies, this measure gauges the dollar value (per par value) debtholders get in the actual event of default. These data are taken from Table 2 in Altman and Kishore (1996) and represent average 3-digit SIC-level recovery values for defaults occurring over the 1971-1995 period (industry-level, time-invariant data). The …nal proxy I consider follows earlier papers that look at asset tangibility as a determinant of …rm capital structure (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988)). I use a …rm's "R&D intensity" (de…ned as the ratio of R&D expenditures over total assets) to gauge the extent to which a …rm's assets are speci…c to the …rm.
Externally-Financed Investment. The analysis of Section 2 pertains to the ex post performance of projects that are externally-…nanced. In principle, a …rm's overall investment should contribute to its business performance and add to its value. But in a world with moral hazard, that principle need not hold for all investment. Projects that are …nanced with external funds are prone to mismanagement, unless, as the theory suggests, asset liquidation is a credible course of action.
Testing the theory would require one to identify …rm investments that are primarily …nanced by …rm outsiders (outside equity and debt). This identi…cation is not obvious when one works with data from real-world public …rms. These …rms make investment outlays on a continuous basis, and investment expenditures are typically not assigned to particular sources of funds. Yet one can gauge the extent to which current investment is more or less dependent on outside funding by isolating from a company's total outlays in a given period the component that can be explained by funding that is obtained from the credit markets in previous periods. Denote the component of …rm Investment (item #128 divided by lagged item #8) that is explained by recent external fund in ‡ows by Financed-
Investment. In what follows, I proxy for the latter measure using the linear projection of Investment onto the space spanned by two lags of the ratio of the total net equity issuances (item #108 -item #115) plus net debt issuances (item #111 -item #114) to the beginning-of-period market value of assets (item #6 + (item #24 item #25) item #60 item #74), call this ratio New External Funds. 13 I perform this estimation for every individual …rm in my sample. To be precise, Financed-Investment is computed as the predicted values from the following …rm-by-…rm regression:
where is a constant term.
To the extent that the estimation of Eq. (9) returns relevant information about the correlation between …rm investment and external funding, one can use it to assess the performance of externally-1 3 Any number of lags between two and four years in the investment-external funding relation yields similar inferences.
…nanced investment in the IV-type framework described next. Note that the estimation of (9) is not meant to fully characterize the determinants of investment demand, rather it is meant to produce a measure of empirical association. Clearly, one concern with this construct is whether (9) yields noisy projected values. Crucially, notice that noisy measurement can only bias the tests below against …nding the hypothesized e¤ect of tangibility on the performance of externally-…nanced investment.
Another issue to consider is whether leverage (a proxy for debtholders'claim on the …rm's assets)
should be used to characterize external …nancing in this context. For one thing, one can argue that a …rm is close to bankruptcy events when leverage is high, and this should too create an association between incentives to perform (under high leverage) and collateral. One problem with using leverage is that it denies a role for outside equity in providing incentives through reorganization threats. In addition, leverage may a¤ect performance in ways that unrelated to the analysis of Section 2 (e.g., debt overhang); these confounding e¤ects may misidentify the test of the theory I am interested in.
The measure in (9) does not gauge default probability, but it does provide, on a …rm-by-…rm basis, a historical measure of the interest held by outside investors over a …rm's …xed assets. If a …rm has used mostly internal funds to …nance investment over the years, it will have both low leverage and a low measure of Financed-Investment. 14 In later tests, I disaggregate New External Funds between new equity issuance and new debt issuance in order to check whether my results vary according to the speci…c type of …nancing instrument used (see Section 3.4.4).
Empirical Speci…cation
The baseline model I use to estimate the impact of external …nancing and tangibility on business performance resembles that of Opler and Titman (1994 ), Campello (2003 ), and Campello and Fluck (2004 . In addition to the main elements of my theory, the speci…cation includes controls that are typical of studies on competitive performance: Size, the log of total assets (item #6); Cash Flow, the ratio of operating income (item #18 + item #14) to beginning-of-the-period assets; and Leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets. The …rst of these controls captures the amount of variation in …rm performance that can be attributed to the scale of operations. Using a lag of the second variable, Cash Flow, captures the e¤ect of …rm-speci…c factors contributing to long-run performance.
Leverage expunges from the variation in performance the component that is explained by the …rm's beginning-of-period …nancial status. 15 The inclusion of leverage is important in order to control for the …rm's pre-existing capital structure when assessing the impact of incremental external …nance 1 4 Not surprisingly, Table 2 below shows a very strong correlation between New External Funds and leverage. 1 5 See Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) for a model (and evidence) relating a …rm's …nancial status and its inability/unwillingness to invest in market share building. Links between past and current performance are discussed in Opler and Titman (1994) and Campello (2003) .
on performance (more on this below). 16 The paper's baseline regression model has the following general form:
Performance i;t = 0 + 1 Si ze i;t + 2 Cash F low i;t 1 + 3 Leverage i;t 1 (10)
+ 4 F inanced-Investment i;t 1 + 5 T angibility i;t 1 + 6 (F inanced-Investment T angibility) i;t 1 + " i;t :
Both …rm Performance (either proxied by sales growth, Q, or ROA) and all of the right-hand side variables are adjusted for their industry-year medians whenever feasible. In other words, a …rm's use of external funds, asset tangibility, and performance are all measured relative to that of its industry-year rivals. In all estimations, I correct the regression error structure for within-…rm residual clustering and heteroskedasticity using White-Huber's consistent estimator. 17
Focusing on within industry-year dynamics naturally ensures that unobserved, time-varying industry e¤ects will not bias my inferences. Importantly, to the extent that rivals' asset tangibility, …nances, and performance are ultimately outside of the …rm's control set, the issue of endogeneity is minimized in my relative-to-rival regressions. Yet one could argue that a …rm could strategically "pick" the composition of its asset structure (thereby a¤ecting asset tangibility) in anticipation of future relative-to-rival product market performance. This argument could pose a threat to the identi…cation of Eq. (10) and suggests the use of more exogenous measures of asset tangibility. To minimize the bite of this critique, I also use industry-level measures of tangibility in the estimation of Eq. (10).
According to the theory, the extent to which external …nancing enhances performance should increase with asset tangibility. While Eq. (10) yields a direct linear measure of the e¤ect of tangibility on performance-external …nancing sensitivities, note that its interactive form makes the interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients less obvious. In particular, if one wants to gauge the partial e¤ect of externally-…nanced investment on …rm performance, one has to read o¤ the result from 4 + 6 T angibility. Note also that 4 says little about the impact of external …nancing on performance. That coe¢ cient represents the impact of external funding when tangibility equals zero, a point that lies outside of the empirical distribution of my empirical measures of tangibility. 18 The summary statistics reported in Table 2 below will aid in the interpretation of the regression estimates. Table 1 reports summary statistics for each of the variables used in the main estimations. The median …rm in the sample has 29 million dollars (1971 terms) in assets and its CPI-adjusted annual 1 6 In latter tests, I will explicitly treat leverage as an endogenous regressor in GMM estimations. 1 7 Treating …rm e¤ects as …xed, as opposed to random (as I do), brings no changes to the inferences that are drawn from the results returned from Eq. (10). I avoid adding …rm-…xed e¤ects to (10) because my estimations already interactively control for industry-and year-…xed e¤ects. In addition, note that my basic measure of …rm performance is in changes.
Summary Statistics
1 8 The linear estimator for interactive models will produce vector coe¢ cients for the "main" e¤ects of the interacted variables even when those e¤ects accrue to data points that lie outside of the actual sample distribution.
sales growth is about 5%. This …rm has a debt-to-equity ratio of approximately 0.19 and a ratio of operating income to asset is of some 9%. The numbers in the table also suggest that a sizeable portion of funds raised externally are used to …nance capital expenditures (roughly, some 30 cents out of every dollar recently raised were spent on capital acquisitions). The table displays two basic measures of asset tangibility. The …rst measure indicates that the median …rm's assets in liquidation can be expected to fetch 55 cents for each dollar on the …rm's books. The second suggests that about 7% of the total amount spent on …xed capital acquisitions in the representative …rm's industry are comprised of used plants end equipment. 19 Table 1 about here Table 2 reports the contemporaneous correlation between each of the independent (and auxiliary) variables used in the main estimations below. The sample I use displays well-documented properties of the data in COMPUSTAT, such as the strong negative association between debt and operating income (correlation coe¢ cient of 0:22) and a positive association between investment and cash ‡ow. Leverage is positively associated with …rm-level tangibility (see Campello (2005)), and …rms in industries with more active markets for second-hand equipment have higher leverage (consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). More interestingly, the table reveals a negative association between new external …nancing and cash ‡ow from operations (internal funds), while both sources of funds are positively associated with capital expenditures. These associations suggest that …rms rely on external funds for investment when there is an internal funds shortfall. Accordingly, the table also shows that while Financed-Investment is positively related with external funding, it is negatively related to internal cash ‡ows, yet positively related with gross investment. In other words, …rms often use funds from the capital markets to partially …nance their investments, specially when cash ‡ows are low. Finally, Table 2 shows that asset tangibility is (weakly) negatively associated with new external funding and with the component of investment that is explained by external funding sources. 
Empirical Results

Investment, External Financing, and Performance: Base Tests
In taking my story to the data, I begin with a set of tests that focus on …rm real (as opposed to …nan-cial) performance. In particular, I look at the …rm's product market performance (other performance measures are examined shortly). The …rst order of business is to check whether the speci…cation of Eq.
(10) can be used in my sample to replicate the results in the literature of interactions between …nanc-ing and product market outcomes -this is the performance-…nancing benchmark test setting my analysis builds on. Secondly, I also need to check whether the proxy I propose for externally-…nanced investments (Financed-Investment) behaves in the very same way as gross (i.e., total) investment as a determinant of …rm performance. It will be di¢ cult to make the case for a moral hazard story if total …rm investment leads to the same performance outcomes that are associated with the component of investment that is funded by …rm outsiders. Table 3 presents the results returned from various models of product market performance. They resemble the basic form of Eq. (10), but for now lack the interaction e¤ect between asset tangibility and externally-…nanced investment. Under the …rst column in the table, a simple sales growth regression is estimated. Without taking into account industry and year idiosyncractic e¤ects, the results suggest that …rm size, past pro…tability, and past investment contribute to …rm sales growth, while debt taking hurts sales performance. The second set of results, under column (2), lead to similar inferences when industry-year e¤ects are introduced. Among other things, they suggest that relatively high use of debt …nancing leads to relative-to-rival sales underperformance (a result …rst reported in Opler and Titman (1994)).
Table 3 about here
Since much of the recent research in capital structure-product market interactions is concerned with the endogeneity of …nancial structure, in column (3) I explicitly treat Leverage as an endogenous variable in a GMM estimation where past lags of …rm operating income are included in the instrument set (see Campello and Fluck (2004) ). Following Bound et al. (1995) , instrument relevance is veri…ed by looking at the signi…cance of the squared partial correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor (the …rst stage partial F -statistics). Instrument validity is diagnosed via Hansen's (1982) J -statistic. 20 In column (4), Investment is also instrumented in a GMM estimation that uses two lags of the level of …xed capital in the instrument set. 21 Under both of these GMM estimations, Leverage has no impact on …rm relative-to-industry performance, whereas total …rm investment (Investment) behaves as an important determinant of performance.
Column (5) reports the …rst set of results from a model including Financed-Investment. Those results are striking in that they suggest that, on average, externally-…nanced investment is not associated with improved …rm performance. This is markedly di¤erent from the impact of total …rm investment on performance that was observed in columns (1) through (4). Column (6) presents 2 0 One can accept the null that the instrument set satis…es the orthogonality conditions if the p-values associated with the J -statistics exceed the 10% cut-o¤. (Note that this test is known to over-reject the null hypothesis.) 2 1 The rationale for this instrument is that investment in an speci…c asset category should depend negatively on the initial stock of that asset because of decreasing marginal valuation associated with stock levels.
results from a GMM estimation that takes Leverage as endogenously chosen. Here, too, FinancedInvestment has no impact on …rm performance. Although these results alone cannot support the case for moral hazard under external …nancing, they help reduce concerns with simultaneity in Eq.
(10) as that they show that (a) outside …nanciers do not seem to systematically invest in projects whose success they are able to forecast and (b) the performance of internally-…nanced investment is superior to that of externally-…nanced investment.
The estimations under columns (7) through (10) look at the impact of Financed-Investment on performance after taking into account the main e¤ect of tangibility, where I consider two proxies for tangibility. All estimations are performed via GMM. They still show that the component of external …nance that is used to fund capital expenditures does not in ‡uence performance whereas total capital investment (…nanced with internal and external funds) leads …rms to outperform their rivals. The measures of tangibility used in those estimations display a di¤erent impact on sales performance. The …rst measure, essentially a relative-to-rival measure of asset liquidation value, suggests that rivals with higher tangibility perform better (even after controlling for the amount of investment that is …nanced with outside funds). The second measure, based on industry-level asset redeployment ratios, suggests a negative, statistically insigni…cant association between asset tangibility and …rm performance.
External Financing and Firm Performance: The Impact of Asset Tangibility
After setting up a feasible empirical strategy, I turn to the testing of the central idea of the paper: that asset tangibility can enhance the performance of investments that are …nanced with external funds.
Although my baseline tests continue to focus on product markets (relative-to-rival sales growth), I also use a forwarding-looking measure of …rm value/growth opportunities, Q, and an accounting measure of returns, ROA, in order to assess performance under external …nancing.
The main results of the paper are presented in Table 4 . Each of the two panels of Table 4 has four pairs of regressions (each model is estimated via both OLS and GMM). In the …rst and second pairs of estimations, the dependent variable is sales growth, the third pair uses Q as the dependent variable, and the fourth uses ROA. The di¤erence between the …rst and second estimation pairs is that the …rst uses …rm (gross) Investment and its interaction with Tangibility in the model's right-hand side, while the second uses Financed-Investment. All estimations of Panel A use a …rm-level proxy for asset tangibility that gauges expected asset liquidation values (based on Berger et al. (1996) ). Industry-year e¤ects are imposed onto those estimations by way of subtracting industry-year medians from each of the variables. The estimations in Panel B use an industry-level measure of asset redeployment as the proxy for Tangibility that is based on data from the Bureau of Census. These estimations do not allow for interactive industry-year adjustments, but they allow for the inclusion of individual industry and year dummies. In all, Table 4 reports the results from 16 estimations capturing the e¤ect of asset tangibility on …rm performance through either gross or externally-…nanced investment.
Table 4 about here
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that while the contribution of gross capital expenditures to positive performance outcomes is independent of the level of asset tangibility, the component of investment that is …nanced through external funds drives major shifts in performance conditional on the level of asset tangibility. To be precise, the interaction between Investment and Tangibility attracts a statistically insigni…cant coe¢ cient, with the "main" (intercept) Investment attracting a positive coe¢ cient. This contrasts with the results from the regressions using The results from Table 4 are fully consistent with the idea that the realization of asset tangibility will help determine the future performance of externally-…nanced investment. To gauge the economic meaning of the mechanism depicted by the table's estimates, consider the GMM regression that uses sales growth as a measure of performance from Panel A. Notice that when calculated at the …rst decile of Tangibility (i.e., at 0:43) the partial e¤ect of a one-standard-deviation increase in externally…nanced investment (which is equal to 0:09) on relative-to-rival annual sales growth is about 1:0%
(t-statistic of 1:70), while at the ninth decile of the same tangibility measure (0:70) that partial e¤ect equals +4:2% (t-statistic of 2:99). 22 Analogous calculations for gross investment (Investment) yield economically and statistically insigni…cant e¤ects. Since I am not estimating a structural model, these economic magnitudes should be interpreted with caution. Yet, they suggest that external …nancing without tangible recourse (low collateral values) produces investment decisions that lead to mild underperformance, while that same source of …nancing is ex post associated with superior performance when asset tangibility is high (i.e., when asset liquidity makes liquidation threat more credible).
The remaining coe¢ cients in Table 4 also display patterns that are consistent with the existing literature and my previous …ndings. Noteworthy, the coe¢ cient returned for Tangibility is negative in many of the estimations, although often statistically insigni…cant. When I estimate the implied e¤ect of tangibility on performance with other regressors held at the average, the partial impact of tangibility is economically small. These small direct e¤ects suggest that the main impact of asset tangibility on corporate performance is associated with its role of providing …rm insiders with incentives to adopt value-/performance-maximizing policies when liquidation by external …nanciers is more credible.
Alternative Measures of Tangibility
While the proxies I have used seem to capture important dimensions of a …rm's asset tangibility, one would like to know if my inferences generalize to measures that re ‡ect di¤erent characterizations of what outside investors may expect to obtain from a …rm's assets. In order to check the robustness of my …ndings, I re-run the baseline regression model that features sales growth as the dependent variable using three alternative measures of tangibility. The results are in Table 5 .
Table 5 about here
The …rst alternative tangibility proxy I use is a measure of the ease with which industry rivals might be able to promptly acquire a …rm's assets at a particular point in time: the industry-year median cash-to-assets ratio (rivals'"…nancial ‡exibility"). The results from speci…cations using this proxy are shown in Panel A of Table 5 . The estimates in this panel suggest that the impact of external …nancing on performance increases when a …rm's rivals are a ‡oat with cash. In both OLS and GMM estimations, the Financed-Investment Tangibility interaction terms are signi…cant at 1% test level and they dominate the implied e¤ect of Financed-Investment upon …rm performance.
The second alternative proxy for tangibility is based on 3-digit industry-level average recovery ratios of defaulted bonds. The …gures are taken from Altman and Kishore (1996) and were used in Hennessy (2004) as a proxy for outside investors' willingness to re…nance a …rm. One di¢ culty with this proxy is that only a small number of industries in the manufacturing sector are covered by the Altman and Kishore (1996) data, which signi…cantly reduces the size of the sample. Another limitation is that this proxy is time-invariant. The results in Panel B of Table 5 show that, although di¤erent from the previous measures, recovery ratios convey similar -albeit less statistically strong -inferences about the impact of tangibility on performance: externally-…nanced investment is associated with superior business performance when …rms display higher asset tangibility. Table 5 uses an inverse measure of …rm R&D-intensity as a proxy for asset tangibility (cf. Titman and Wessels (1988) ). 23 Results from the estimation in Panel C, too, are consistent with the idea that asset tangibility (here, the inverse of the degree of …rm asset-speci…city) leads to a positive association between external …nancing and performance.
Panel C of
Is it Debt or Equity?
Because a …rm's liquidation is generally triggered by holders of debt securities, one would naturally think of the argument I propose as one that applies exclusively to debt …nancing. However, it is not necessarily true that the argument that asset values positively in ‡uence …rm performance under 2 3 To be consistent with the other proxies, I measure a …rm's tangibility in a given year as the result from 1 -(item #46 / item #6). Noteworthy, replacing missing observations in item #46 with 0 does not a¤ect the results. external …nancing is only valid when outsiders provide funds via debt instruments. Asset tangibility may give outside equity the same sort of leverage over managerial behavior when a …rm's assets are expected to maintain value through shareholder-led asset restructurings (see Fluck (1998) ).
To test whether debt and equity …nanciers independently hold a more credible threat to actions that elicit superior corporate performance when the …rm has more valuable assets, I re-estimate my baseline regression computing Financed-Investment using either new debt or new equity issues.
Call New Debt Issues the ratio of the total net debt issuances to beginning-of-period market value of assets. Panel A of Table 6 displays the results returned from the estimation of Eq. (10) 
when
Financed-Investment is computed as the predicted values from the following …rm-by-…rm regression:
Analogously, de…ne New Equity Issues as the ratio of the total net equity issuances to beginning-ofperiod market value of assets. Panel B of Table 6 reports results that are obtained when FinancedInvestment is computed as the …rm-speci…c predicted values from:
Remarkably, the sets of estimates from Panels A and B in Table 6 suggest that both debt and equity investors observe an improvement in performance as the underlying value of the assets of the …rm increase in value. Although the empirical estimates vary somewhat across the two panels (arguably, they seem somewhat stronger for debt), they are consistent with the arguments proposed above. 
Robustness
I subject my baseline tests to a number of additional checks in order to address potential concerns about model speci…cation, empirical biases, and other estimation issues. These tests include the use of additional explanatory variables, the use of alternative lagging structures in the main speci…cation, experimenting with di¤erent sets of instruments, further eliminating outliers, and examining estimates from subsamples. The results from these standard checks do not challenge to my conclusions and are omitted from the paper for the sake of space (they are readily available from the author).
Alternatively, in this section I try to pose a couple of challenges to the very logic of my …ndings.
Further Simultaneity Concerns
One potential problem with my baseline regression is that I use a measure of …rm investment (…xed capital expenditures) that both adds to …rm performance and to a …rm's stock of tangible assets. Focusing on …xed capital could "hard-wire"the results I get if …rms with better investment opportunities both …nd it easier to borrow from outside investors and become, on the margin, more tangible under external borrowing. One way to check if my previous results are mechanically generated by my test design is to look for an investment category that adds to performance, but does not add to tangibility.
One such category is investment in R&D: a …rm's investment in product research and development should contribute to product market performance (e.g., Opler and Titman (1994) ), but those expenditures tend to create very little tangible assets. Accordingly, I re-run my baseline regression using R&D investment (as opposed to capital expenditures) as a measure of investment (i.e., in the computation of Financed-Investment). The results are shown in Table 7 . The estimates in the table make it clear that the performance of externally-…nanced investment increases with the underlying asset tangibility even for an investment category that on the margin adds nothing to tangibility. These results make it di¢ cult to argue that performance reverse-causes tangibility through external …nancing. 
Exogenous Shocks to Tangibility: Macroeconomic Movements
It is worthwhile developing an extra check for the concern that the endogeneity of asset tangibility could generate the results I report. In this section, I propose a test that looks at the link between relative-to-rival performance and tangibility when the latter variable (exogenously) collapses, losing a signi…cant portion of its within-industry variability. This testing represents a signi…cant departure from those discussed thus far. To wit, rather than emphasizing micro-level, cross-sectional correlations from panel data, the test below will emphasize the macro-level, intertemporal dynamics of the theory. While it is impossible to completely rule out concerns with endogenous biases in …rm-level tests (for example, stemming from unobserved heterogeneity), such concerns carry less weight in the experiment developed next. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose that a …rm will have a particularly di¢ cult time liquidating its productive assets when the circumstances leading the …rm to economic distress may also a¤ect the economic viability of its assets'best alternative users: other …rms in the same industry. In particular, when an industry is hit by an economic downturn, the value of tangible assets such as inventories and …xed capital might collapse across all …rms in the industry. It thus follows that the tangibilitydriven cross-sectional link between …rm performance and externally-…nanced investment should be particularly weaker when industries experience economic distress. This suggests a test for the theory that is based on the intertemporal behavior of tangibility and the link between performance and externally-…nanced investment.
The existing literature suggests a natural laboratory for this test. Based on the well-documented high cyclicality of durable goods sales, I look at the behavior of the estimates returned for the term Financed-Investment Tangibility from Eq. (10) over the course of the business cycle for …rms in those industries. To wit, because durable goods producers are highly cycle-sensitive, negative shocks to demand will likely a¤ect all best alternative users of a durables producer's assets, depressing the tangibility of all industry competitors. Should the value of inventories, receivables, and …xed equipment (the categories of assets used in my baseline tangibility proxy) sharply decline for all durable goods producers in recessions, then, if asset tangibility drives my results, one should expect a lower empirical estimate of the coe¢ cient associated with Financed-Investment Tangibility in the regression of relative-to-rival performance for …rms in those particular industries/time periods.
To implement the test of this hypothesis, I …rst identify those sample …rms that belong to durables industries. I then test my conjecture about the intertemporal dynamics of the tangibility e¤ect via a two-step approach that is similar to that used by Almeida and Campello (2004) . The idea is to relate the empirical estimate for Financed-Investment Tangibility from Eq. (10) and shocks to product demand by combining cross-sectional and times series regressions. The …rst step of this procedure consists of estimating the baseline regression model (Eq. (10)) every year both via OLS and GMM.
From each sequence of cross-sectional regressions, I collect the coe¢ cients returned for the interaction between Financed-Investment and Tangibility (i.e., 6 ) and 'stack' them into the vector t . This vector is then used as the dependent variable in the following (second stage) time series regression: 24
I am interested in the impact of negative aggregate activity shocks, proxied by an indicator for NBER recessions (NBER), on the importance of tangibility as a driver of performance-…nanced-investment sensitivities. 25 Because movements in aggregate demand and other key macroeconomic variables tend to coincide, I also include controls for in ‡ation (log CPI) and basic interest rates (Fed funds rate, or FF ). 26 Finally, a time trend (T rend) is included to capture secular movements in the dependent variable.
The results from the two-stage estimator are summarized in Table 8. The table reports To see how this procedure accounts for the error contained in the …rst step, assume that the true t equals what is estimated from the …rst-step run ( t) plus some residual ( t): t = t + t. One would like to estimate Eq. (13) as t = + X + !t, where the error term would only re ‡ect the errors associated with model misspeci…cation. However, the empirical version of Eq. (13) uses t (rather than t ) on the right hand-side. Consequently, so long as E [X 0 ] = 0, will absorb the mean of t, while ut will be a mixture of t and !t. Thus, the measurement errors of the …rst step will increase the total error variance in the second step, but will not bias the coe¢ cient estimates in .
2 5 The NBER recession indicator will assign to 1 any year containing two or more quarters characterized as recessionary by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The results from the various versions of the two-step procedure reported in Table 8 all suggest that the e¤ect of tangibility on performance-…nanced-investment sensitivities sharply declines when assets are expected to fetch very low values in liquidation (i.e., durable goods industries in recessions).
These results agree with the arguments I propose and are immune to concerns that relative future …rm performance reverse-causes asset tangibility.
Concluding Remarks
When the value of a …rm's assets fall sharply under liquidation or reorganization, outside creditors may have little or no incentives to enforce contractual clauses that lead to …rm liquidation or reorganization. Instead, those creditors may allow the …rm to continue, and they may even re…nance the …rm under its current management. The problem that this creates is that …rm insiders will then have fewer incentives to implement value-enhancing policies when these policies are costly for them. In contrast, re…nancing is less likely to occur when the …rm's assets can fetch high values outside of the …rm. Under these circumstances, liquidation becomes as credible course of action and …rm insiders will have heightened incentives to implement value-enhancing policies.
This paper empirically examines the role of asset tangibility in in ‡uencing …rm performance under external …nancing. It explores the idea that, if following the contracting of external funds a …rm's assets turn out to be highly tangible (i.e., easy to liquidate), …rm insiders will then have heightened incentives to perform. The empirical tests show that measures of …rm performance in its product market (relative-to-rival sales growth), future growth/value (proxied by Q), and accounting returns (ROA)
all increase with the component of …rm investment that is explained by recent external …nancing activities when the …rm's assets are ex post more tangible (i.e., expected liquidation values and/or redeployability are high). Remarkably, these e¤ects are not observed for the …rm's total investment ratios:
it is only the component of investment that is associated with external funds that transmit the hypothesized creditor valuation e¤ect of asset tangibility onto …rm performance. Inferences that the …rm observe superior business performance under external …nancing when assets are highly tangible hold for both outside equity and debt …nancing and also for alternate empirical proxies for asset tangibility. Rajan, R., and A. Winton, 1995, "Covenants and Collateral . Sales Growth is the log change in total …rm sales (reported in percentage terms). Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. ROA is computed as annual net income over beginning-of-period assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures over beginning-of-period …xed capital. N ew External F inance is the ratio of net new issues of debt and equity to the beginning-of-period market value of assets. F inanced-Investment is the linear projection of Investment onto two lags of N ew External F inance. There are two baseline measures of asset tangibility (T angibility). The …rst is based on a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996) This table reports the contemporaneous correlation structure of the independent variables used in the regression estimations. The data are collected annually from COMPUSTAT from 1971 through 2002. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures over beginning-of-period …xed capital. N ew External F inance is the ratio of net new issues of debt and equity to the beginning-of-period market value of assets. F inanced-Investment is the linear projection of Investment onto two lags of N ew External F inance. There are two measures of asset tangibility (T angibility). The …rst is based on a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996) OLS and GMM pooled times-series cross-section regressions. The dependent variable is Sales Growth, equal to the log change in total …rm sales. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures over beginning-of-period …xed capital. F inanced-Investment is the linear projection of the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets onto two lags of the ratio of new external …nancing to the beginning-of-period market value of assets. There are two measures of asset tangibility (T angibility). The …rst is based on a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996) ). The second is an industry-level measure of asset redeployment (data from the Bureau of Census). In GMM estimations, Leverage is explicitly treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by two lags (lags 2 and 3) of …rm cash ‡ows. In column (4), Investment is also treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented with two lags of beginning-of-period level of capital stock (PPE) over total assets. The sample period is 1971 through 2002. Included …rms are from industries selected at the four-digit SIC level. Industry-year median e¤ects are used in columns (2) through (8); only industry-years providing more than …ve observations enter these estimations. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-…rm error clustering using the White-Huber estimator. OLS and GMM pooled times-series cross-section regressions. The speci…cations use three alternative measures of business performance/value (the dependent variable). The …rst is Sales Growth, equal to the log change in total …rm sales. The second is Q, the market value of assets to book value of assets. ROA is computed as annual net income over beginning-of-period assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over the beginning-of-period assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures over beginning-of-period …xed capital. F inancedInvestment is the linear projection of the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets onto two lags of the ratio of new external …nancing to the beginning-of-period market value of assets. There are two measures of asset tangibility (T angibility). The …rst is based on a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (used in Panel A) and the second on an industry-level measure of asset redeployment (used in Panel B). In Panel A, all variables are adjusted for their four-digit SIC industry-year medians (interactive e¤ects). In Panel B, estimations include separate industry and year dummies. In GMM estimations, Leverage is explicitly treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by two lags (lags 2 and 3) of …rm cash ‡ows. The sample period is 1971 through 2002. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-…rm error clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Note: ** and * indicate statistical signi…cance at the 1% and 5% (two-tailed) test levels, respectively. In Panel A, T angibility is measured as the industry-year median ratio of cash and other liquid securities to total assets. In Panel B, T angibility is measured as the average 3-digit SIC-level historical recovery ratios for defaulted corporate bonds (taken from Table 2 in Altman and Kishore (1996) ). In Panel C, T angibility is computed annually at the …rm level as 1 minus the ratio of R&D expenditures over total assets. The dependent variable is Sales Growth, equal to the log change in total …rm sales. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over the beginning-of-period assets.
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures over beginning-of-period …xed capital. F inanced-Investment is the linear projection of the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets onto two lags of the ratio of new external …nancing to the beginning-of-period market value of assets. In Panel C, all variables are adjusted for their four-digit SIC industry-year medians. In GMM estimations, Leverage is explicitly treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by two lags (lags 2 and 3) of …rm cash ‡ows. The sample period is 1971 through 2002. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-…rm error clustering using the White-Huber estimator. OLS and GMM pooled times-series cross-section regressions. The speci…cations use two alternative measures of externally-…nanced investment (F inanced-Investment). In Panel A, F inanced-Investment is the linear projection of the ratio of capital expenditures over lagged …xed capital onto two lags of the ratio of net debt issuance over the lagged market value of assets. In Panel B, F inancedInvestment is similarly computed from a regression that uses two lags the ratio of net equity issues to assets. There are three measures of …rm performance/value (the dependent variable). The …rst is Sales Growth, equal to the log change in total …rm sales. The second is Q, the market value of assets to book value of assets. The third measure is ROA, computed as annual net income over beginning-of-period assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over the beginning-of-period assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. T angibility is a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (based on Berger et al. (1996) ). All variables are adjusted for their four-digit SIC industry-year medians. In GMM estimations, Leverage is explicitly treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by two lags (lags 2 and 3) of …rm cash ‡ows. The sample period is 1971 through 2002. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-…rm error clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Note: ** and * indicate statistical signi…cance at the 1% and 5% (two-tailed) test levels, respectively. Note: ** and * indicate statistical signi…cance at the 1% and 5% (two-tailed) test levels, respectively. Table 7 . Asset Tangibility, External Financing, and Business Performance: R&D Investment OLS and GMM pooled times-series cross-section regressions. The estimations substitute …xed capital investment with R&D investment in the baseline model. There are three measures of …rm performance/value (the dependent variable). The …rst is Sales Growth, equal to the log change in total …rm sales. The second is Q, the market value of assets to book value of assets. The third measure is ROA, computed as annual net income over beginning-of-period assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Cash F low is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over the beginning-of-period assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to assets. F inanced-R&D is the linear projection of the ratio of R&D expenditures over assets onto two lags of the ratio of new external …nancing to the beginningof-period market value of assets. T angibility is a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (based on Berger et al. (1996) ). All variables are adjusted for their four-digit SIC industry-year medians. In GMM estimations, Leverage is explicitly treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by two lags (lags 2 and 3) of …rm cash ‡ows. The sample period is 1971 through 2002. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-…rm error clustering using the White-Huber estimator. The dependent variable is the (…rst stage) OLS and GMM estimated interaction between F inanced-Investment and T angibility in a regression model featuring relative-to-rival sales growth as the performance measure (see Eq. (10) in the text). In 'univariate'estimations, the dependent variable is regressed on one lag of an indicator for NBER recession years (N BER from Eq. (13)), a constant, and a time trend (coe¢ cients ommited). In 'multivariate' estimations, the levels of in ‡ation (Log of CPI) and of basic interest rates (Fed funds rate) are also included. 
